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CYBERTHREATS AND THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: 
SPECULATIONS 
 
Susan W. Brenner* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As I have explained elsewhere, cyberthreats – cybercrime, 
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare – create new challenges for 
nation-states because they do not conform to the essentially 
dichotomous threat model that has evolved over the last few 
centuries.1  Every human social system must maintain a baseline of 
order if it is to survive and prosper.2  Order is essential if the 
individuals who comprise such a system are to carry out the tasks 
that are essential for their survival and for the consequent survival 
of that social system.3 
Threats to order come both from the “inside” and the 
“outside.”4  “Outside” threats – acts of war – come from other 
social systems, e.g., other nation-states.5  Individuals, of course, 
conduct war, but in so doing they act on behalf of their sovereign; 
they are basically the instruments states use to challenge the 
viability of another state.6   
“Inside” threats come from within a system, where citizens 
prey on other citizens in various ways.  Since humans are 
individually intelligent, they can choose not to follow the rules that 
otherwise ensure internal order, i.e., they can commit crimes or 
acts of terrorism.7  Unless societies develop techniques that control 
such activity, crime and/or terrorism will threaten the stability of a 
social system.8   
                                                
* Samuel A. McCray Chair in Law, University of Dayton School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: 
Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 65 (2004); see also SUSAN W. 
BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION-STATE 
29 (2009).   
2 See, e.g., Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed 
Security, supra note 1, at 9. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 10−11. 
5 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to 
Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 402 
(2007). 
6 See id. at 402−03. 
7 See Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 
supra note 1, at 35.   
8 See id. at 45−46. 
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The next section reviews how Anglo-American societies 
have dealt with the need to control both types of threats and 
thereby ensure the order necessary for a society to survive.  
 
I.  The Militia, the Posse Comitatus and the Posse Comitatus 
Act 
 
 The militia and the posse comitatus evolved in Anglo-
Saxon England and were brought to what would become the 
United States by the British colonists.9  In Anglo-Saxon times, and 
for centuries thereafter, Britain did not have either a standing army 
or a professional police force.10  Instead, it relied on two ad hoc 
entities, both of which were composed of the able-bodied men of 
the community, who were required to be armed and prepared to 
use those arms when called upon for assistance.11 
 When this ad hoc group was called upon to repel a foreign 
enemy, it was the militia; when it was called upon to apprehend 
criminals, it was the posse comitatus.12  This system prevailed until 
into the nineteenth century.13  It faded away as it became apparent 
that the militia was no match for professional soldiers, and the 
posse comitatus was not capable of dealing with the urban crime 
that emerged as the century progressed.14   
 The eventual result was that by the twentieth century the 
United States, along with other countries, had a bifurcated threat-
control system: the military, an institution staffed by trained 
professionals, deals with threats from “outside,” i.e., with attacks 
launched by other nation-states.15 And the process of controlling 
internal threats – crime and terrorism – became the responsibility 
of professional police forces,16 which trace their origin to Sir 
Robert Peel’s establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 
                                                
9 See, e.g., BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS, supra note 1, at 167.  
10 See id.; see also Harold S. Herd, A Re-Examination of the Firearms 
Regulation Debate and Its Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 200 (1997).   
11 See, e.g., Herd, supra note 10.  
12 See, e.g., Worth v. Craven County Com’rs, 24 S.E. 778, 779 (N.C. 1896).  
13 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178−79 (1939); see also 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29, 
174 (1994). 
14 See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, The Second Amendment “Right to Bear Arms” and 
United States v. Emerson, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 5−6 (2003); see also 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 181, 188−90 (1940). As to professional policing, see, e.g., Brenner, 
Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, supra note 1, at 
61−65.  
15 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 911 (2001). 
16 See id. (“Law enforcement has shifted to police departments”).  
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nineteenth-century London.17  Peel replaced the posse comitatus 
with a uniformed, quasi-military organization, which proved much 
more effective at dealing with the urban crime that increasingly 
plagued British cities and their American counterparts.18  Peel’s 
system spread to other countries, as well.19  The result is that threat 
control is more or less rigidly, depending on the country in 
question, divided between the military (warfare) and the police 
(crime and terrorism).20 
 That was not always true, even after the U.S. adopted 
professional policing.  In the years leading to the Civil War, 
federal marshals used troops to enforce federal law, and after the 
War federal troops enforced the law in the post-Civil War South.21 
As a result of perceived abuses resulting from the latter, in 1878 
Congress adopted the Posse Comitatus Act “to put an end to the 
use of military for ordinary law enforcement purposes.” 22 
The Posse Comitatus Act is still in force and currently states that 
“[w]hoever, except in cases . . . expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force . . . to execute the laws shall be fined . . . or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”23  While the Act 
explicitly applies only to the Army and Air Force, Department of 
Defense regulations extend its restrictions to the Navy and 
Marines.24  
 
                                                
17 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 
1202 (1999).   
18 See, e.g., Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed 
Security, supra note 1, at 63−64. New York established a police force in 1845 
and other cities followed suit. See, e.g., Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 
17, at 1207.  
19 See, e.g., CLIVE EMSLEY & BARBARA WEINBERGER, POLICING WESTERN 
EUROPE: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND PUBLIC ORDER 1−14, 18−24, 55−68 
(Greenwood 1991). 
20 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Cyberthreats and the Limits of Bureaucratic 
Control, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 137, 197–198, 231 (2013). After the 911 
attacks, terrorism’s status as an internal threat began to blur, but that is not an 
issue I can address here, given the brevity of this article.  See, e.g., Mariona 
Llobet, Chapter 5 Terrorism: Limits Between Crime And War. The Fallacy Of 
The Slogan ‘War On Terror’, 14 IUS GENTIUM 101, 101–109 (2012). 
21 See, e.g., Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin 
for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 110−11 (2003); see also 
Sean O’Hara, Comment, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied to the Prosecution of 
Civilians, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 771−72 (2005); see also supra note 18.  
22 See O’Hara, supra note 21, at 772 (citing Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, 
§15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 
(1994))). 
23 18 U.S.C § 1385 (1994).   
24 See O’Hara, supra note 21, at 772  (citing U.S. Dep't of Defense, Directive 
No. 5525.5, amended by No. 3025.21, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Officials, encl. 4 at 4.3 (Jan. 15, 1986)).  
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The Posse Comitatus Act is the primary principle that bars 
the U.S. military from participating in civilian law enforcement.25 
As the Supreme Court noted, its unique and exclusive function is 
“to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”26  
 
II.  Cyberthreats and the Posse Comitatus Act 
 
This section reviews how cyberthreats undermine the 
viability of the threat response system examined in Section I.27  It 
also analyzes whether it would be possible, and prudent, to modify 
the system in ways that could allow for more flexible responses to 
threats of both types.   
 
A.  The Problem  
 
As noted above, the United States, like most twenty-first 
century nation-states, employs a bifurcated threat-response and 
control system which is predicated on the assumption that threats 
to social order are readily divisible into “inside” threats (law 
enforcement) and “outside” threats (the military).  While this 
system has proven quite satisfactory in dealing with real-world 
threats, it breaks down as threat activity migrates “into” 
cyberspace, i.e., as malefactors use digital technology to attack 
individual or governmental targets in their own country or halfway 
around the world. 
  Cyberspace transcends spatial boundaries and thereby 
erodes the distinction between “inside” and “outside” threats.  It 
can be difficult to determine whether cyberattacks came from 
“inside” or “outside" a particular state.  And even if it is clear that 
an attack came from “outside,” the attack may not otherwise 
conform to the definition of an “outside” attack, i.e., an act of war.  
Conversely, when an attack comes from “inside,” it may not 
otherwise conform to the definition of an “inside” attack, i.e., it 
may not clearly qualify as crime or terrorism. 
 For example, in the spring of 2013, Mandiant, a U.S. 
computer security firm, issued a report that described how a 
specialized unit of the People’s Liberation Army28 (“PLA”) was, 
and had for years been, hacking into computers of U.S. businesses 
                                                
25 See, e.g., Adam Burton, Fixing FISA for Long War: Regulating Warrantless 
Surveillance in the Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 389 (2006). 
26 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).   
27 See BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS, supra note 1, at 29.  
28 See Structure and Organization of the Armed Forces, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL 
DEFENSE, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ 
ArmedForces/index.htm. 
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and stealing proprietary information. 29  Stealing proprietary 
information is a federal crime.30  The PLA members who were 
engaging in this activity were therefore committing a crime “in” 
the United States, but this was not a conventional crime.  
Uniformed members of a nation-state’s military acting on behalf of 
their sovereign were committing it.  
 That raises a number of difficult issues.  For one thing, it is 
almost certain that China would not extradite the PLA members to 
the United States to be prosecuted for their crimes because China 
is, at the very least, complicit in those crimes.31  The civilian law 
enforcement system can, as a result, do nothing to retaliate against 
or halt this type of activity.  For another, the scenario seems to mix 
metaphors: since the activity that would otherwise constitute a 
crime was carried out by military personnel who were acting on 
behalf of their sovereign, does it constitute war?  
Or consider a different scenario: in June of 2009, 
cybercriminals surreptitiously extracted $415,989 from an account 
at the First Federal Savings Bank in Shepherdsville, Kentucky.32 
The account belonged to Bullitt County.  The transfers were not 
discovered until the money was gone.  Officials contacted the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which determined the transfers 
originated in Ukraine. The thieves used a Trojan Horse program 
installed on the County Treasurer’s computer to extract the funds.33   
No one was, and no one will be, charged with the Bullitt 
County theft, which is unfortunate because online bank robbery is 
far from uncommon: in the spring of 2013, “hackers in Ukraine 
and Russia” extracted $1.3 million from a Washington hospital.34  
Since the United States does not have an extradition treaty with 
Russia,35 and Ukraine is a cybercrime haven,36 no one will be 
prosecuted for this crime, and, like Bullitt County, this hospital 
will never recover the lost funds. 
                                                
29 See, e.g., David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army 
Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-
hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all.  
30 See 18 U.S.C § 1831 (1996). 
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1996) (The United States and China do not have an 
extradition treaty).   
32 See Brian Krebs, PC Invader Costs Ky. County $415,000, WASH. POST (July 
2, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/07/ 
an_odyssey_of_fraud_part_ii.html.   
33 See id. 
34 See Brian Krebs, Wash. Hospital Hit by $1.03 Million Cyberheist, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (Apr. 13, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/category/ 
smallbizvictims/.   
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1996). 
36 See, e.g., Yuriy Onyshkiv, Ukraine Thrives as Cybercrime Haven, KYIV POST 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-thrives-as-
cybercrime-haven-123965.html.   
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What has all this to do with the Posse Comitatus Act?  It 
has several implications for the system of threat control upon 
which the United States relies.  One consequence of that system is, 
as noted earlier, that law enforcement officers deal with “inside” 
threats, which logically implies that they do not pursue “outside” 
threats.  That, of course, is not literally true, nations have 
developed systems in which officers from various countries can 
cooperate and offenders can be extradited for prosecution in the 
United States.37  
The problem is that, while states have historically had an 
incentive to cooperate in the apprehension and prosecution of 
traditional criminals whose activities can threaten social order in 
more than one state, they may not have an incentive to cooperate 
when the crimes at issue are virtual and have little, if any, 
likelihood of negatively affecting the host country.  Cybercrime 
can bring billions into a country, like Ukraine or Russia; while the 
state itself is usually not complicit in this type of activity, it still 
benefits from it.38  And if the haven state’s law enforcement will 
not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement that effectively means no 
one will be sanctioned for the crime(s).  
If these examples seem trivial in their import, consider this:  
the bank theft cases illustrate the extent to which U.S. law 
enforcement cannot protect American citizens from external crime.  
The Mandiant report illustrates the extent to which neither U.S. 
law enforcement nor the U.S. military can protect American 
citizens from Chinese military personnel who are stealing their 
proprietary information. And to make that scenario more 
interesting, assume that instead of simply stealing trade secrets, the 
PLA members are infiltrating U.S. infrastructures, such as the 
power grid and financial system, in order to acquire the ability to 
sabotage them, in whole or in part.39  
 
B.  Implications for the Posse Comitatus Act? 
 
As we saw above, the United States’ threat response 
systems are of little utility in dealing with attacks from abroad.  
Law enforcement has little ability to operate in other countries, and 
what ability it has depends on the acquiescence and support of the 
government in a particular state.  This is not surprising, since U.S. 
authorities are unlikely to acquiesce in and support the efforts of 
foreign law enforcement officers – Russian police, for example – 
                                                
37 See, e.g., Gregor Urbas, Cybercrime, Jurisdiction and Extradition: The 
Extended Reach of Cross-Border Law Enforcement, 16 No. 1 J. INTERNET L. 1, 
9 −13 (2012).  
38 See, e.g., Russian Hackers Get Big Slice of Cyber Crime Billions, RT (Apr. 
24, 2012), http://rt.com/business/russia-cyber-crimes-cost-860/.  
39 See, e.g., Sanger, Barboza & Perlroth, supra note 29. 
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who wish to conduct an investigation in the United States that 
targets U.S. citizens.  Law enforcement has been, and continues to 
be, parochial.   
 
The military not only has the ability to operate in other 
countries, that is its default mission (absent an armed invasion of 
U.S. territory).  But the military cannot participate in law 
enforcement, at least not under the Posse Comitatus Act.40  While 
it is not clear if the Act applies extraterritorially, the Department of 
Defense operates on the premise that it does, subject to certain 
exceptions.41  The Posse Comitatus Act, then, is the only legal 
principle that bars cooperation between law enforcement and the 
military.  Nothing in the Constitution prohibits this: when the 
Constitution was drafted the nation’s threat control system 
consisted of the able-bodied men of the nation, who acted as law 
enforcers or as members of the military, depending on the 
circumstances.      
Logically, that approach has a certain appeal in a world in 
which computer and other technology erodes the import of national 
boundaries, especially as far as threat control is concerned.  Should 
we reassess the Posse Comitatus Act, with an eye to modifying or 
repealing it? So far, I continue to be agnostic on that issue, but I 
think it is worth exploring to determine if there was a way to think 
about how we might approach threat control differently.  To that 
end, therefore, I shall speculate about what might be involved in 
relaxing or eliminating the Act’s prohibition on cooperation 
between civilian law enforcement and the military.   
 
C.  Repeal or Modify the Posse Comitatus Act 
 
 I begin with the most drastic option – eliminating the Act.  
Actually, I begin with what I see as two, more or less equally 
drastic options:  one is to simply repeal the Posse Comitatus Act, 
thereby eliminating the prohibition on law enforcement-military 
collaboration.  The other, somewhat less drastic option, would be 
to modify the Posse Comitatus Act so that it bars law enforcement-
military collaboration in the physical world but not when the 
activity at issue involves cyberattacks.   
 While the notion of repealing the Posse Comitatus Act has 
an attractive simplicity, I cannot contemplate such a step without 
trepidation.  As one author noted, “there is something inherently 
                                                
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1956). 
41 See, e.g., Cristian DeFrancia, Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: 
The Legality of Preventive Measures, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705, 768 
(2012). 
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repugnant to most Americans at the thought of the military 
patrolling the streets of our cities and towns.”42  This is not 
because we do not trust our military, but because we fear what it 
might become if we took this step.  Also, we would likely gain 
little from repealing the Posse Comitatus Act because the military 
has no expertise in civilian law enforcement.43  If we went down 
this path, we might actually undermine the effectiveness of the 
military and law enforcement by eroding the distinctiveness of 
their respective missions.  And, finally, repealing the Act would be 
overkill, since the bifurcated response system seems to work quite 
well with regard to activity in the physical world. 
 That brings us to the other option – modifying the Posse 
Comitatus Act so it does not bar law enforcement-military 
collaboration with regard to activity that occurs in or is vectored 
through cyberspace.  Since the impetus for reconsidering it is the 
difficulties law enforcement and the military respectively confront 
in dealing with cyberthreats, this would seem a more logical, more 
focused approach.   
 The question then becomes, what, precisely, would we seek 
to achieve by modifying the Posse Comitatus Act?  Do we, for 
example, want our military to be able to act as law enforcement 
agents (or surrogates) when it is necessary to deal with 
cyberattacks from abroad?  If the answer to that question is yes, 
then I have another question: what, precisely, would we want the 
military to do?  
 In both of the scenarios we examined earlier, foreign 
nationals were committing crimes by stealing property (funds in 
one case, trade secrets in the other) from American citizens who 
were in the United States.  In one case, the perpetrators were 
members of the Chinese military; in the other, they were Ukrainian 
citizens.  Unless and until we modify our conceptualization of the 
threat array, the activity in both instances constituted crime, rather 
than warfare.  
 It might, therefore, seem as if the U.S. military would have 
no conceivable role to play in responding to these and similar 
attacks, since I assume no rational person would argue that the 
United States should launch a retaliatory military strike on China 
(or on Ukraine) in response to these thefts.  That does not 
necessarily mean that the U.S. military might not be able to assist 
law enforcement in ways that could enhance the latter’s ability to 
respond effectively to cross-border crimes.   
 
                                                
42 See Dan Bennett, The Domestic Role of the Military in America: Why 
Modifying or Repealing the Posse Comitatus Act Would Be a Mistake, 10 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 935, 944 (2006). 
43 See, e.g., id. at 944−45.   
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 As we saw above, in neither case will U.S. law 
enforcement be able to have the perpetrators extradited so they can 
be charged, prosecuted and presumably convicted in the United 
States.  Some, though, argue that law enforcement should be able 
to employ other measures to create at least something of a 
disincentive to attack Americans.  They contend that U.S. law 
enforcement should be able to use “electronic sanctions” to react to 
cybercrimes.44  Relatively recently, I discussed this issue with a 
former Department of Homeland Security official who, as far as I 
could determine, seemed to be arguing that this type of a response 
is lawful under Model Penal Code § 3.09(1) either to prevent the 
theft of “movable property” or to retake such property.   
 If we accept that argument, at least for the purposes of 
analysis, then we need to address the practicalities it presents:  how 
is U.S. law enforcement going to use virtual force to strike back at 
someone attempting theft who is located in another country?  I 
have not found any authority for this proposition, but I strongly 
suspect U.S. law enforcement does not have the constitution, 
statutory or common law authority to attack targets in another 
country.  The military, of course, does have such authority, at least 
as a general matter.  So if (and I regard that as a significant 
qualifier) we were to decide we want to employ online strike-back 
techniques as a way to create disincentives to use cyberspace to 
attack American targets, and if we made the appropriate 
modifications to the Posse Comitatus Act, the military could either 
support law enforcement’s efforts in this regard or actually be 
responsible for carrying out the strike-back attacks.    
 This is but one obvious example of what allowing U.S. law 
enforcement and the U.S. military to collaborate in dealing with 
extraterritorial cybercrime might involve. I offer this scenario 
purely for the purposes of analysis – as a way of illustrating the 
possible utility of modifying the Posse Comitatus Act to allow this 
type of collaboration.  Personally, I have serious reservations about 
our going down this path.  Aside from anything else, I fear it could 
have serious consequences, i.e., that what began as a law 
enforcement strike-back attack could escalate until the two 
countries were at war with each other, on- and/or off-line.  
 
D.   Allow U.S. Law Enforcement to Support Military’s Efforts 
in Cyberspace 
 
 The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits using the military in 
civilian law enforcement.  It does not prohibit using law 
                                                
44 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA 
L. & TECH. J. 213, 228 (2004). 
 
Fall 2013]               CYBERTHREATS AND THE POSSE             
COMITATUS ACT 
35 
enforcement to support the military’s efforts to deal with attacks 
from other nation-states.  Logically, then, we could allow U.S. law 
enforcement officers to support the military’s efforts to deal with 
cyberattacks that are directed at U.S. targets and that are carried 
out by another nation-state (presumably by its military).   
 The question then becomes, what might we gain from 
taking this step? From the little I know about the U.S. military’s 
preparation for cyberwar, I am quite confident they do not need 
any assistance in developing the appropriate weaponry or skills 
necessary for this endeavor.  I am also assuming that law 
enforcement officers would add little to the military’s ability to 
deal with cyberattacks from other states.  This assumption is 
basically the converse of the assumption we made above, i.e., that 
the military can add little, if anything, to law enforcement’s ability 
to deal with crime, including cybercrime.  
 There is at least one thing that law enforcement might be 
able to contribute to the military’s efforts in this regard: threat 
information.  Unlike conventional warfare, which is conducted in 
public and has traditionally been directed at military targets only, 
cyberattacks tend to be directed at civilian targets.  Earlier, I raised 
the scenario in which PLA members are exploring the networks 
used by U.S. infrastructure providers to learn how to sabotage 
them.45  Civilians, including law enforcement, have much greater 
access to information about activity such as this, because while 
there may be no statutory or constitutional prohibition on the U.S. 
military’s monitoring U.S. civilian entities to detect possible 
cyberthreats, this type of activity would probably encounter 
opposition from the public, and their representatives.46  While it 
would probably not eliminate the opposition, allowing law 
enforcement to share information it collected while legitimately 
carrying out its professional duties might significantly mitigate it.47  
 
E.  Create an Entirely New Entity 
 
 Another option I do not support would be to create a new 
entity, which was neither wholly law enforcement nor wholly 
military but was able to deal with threats that were purely internal, 
purely external, and that had elements of each.  I do not favor this 
because I believe adding another layer of institutional bureaucracy 
would only further impede the nation’s ability to deal effectively 
with cyberthreats. 
 
                                                
45 See Sanger, Barboza & Perlroth, supra note 29.  
46 See generally Mark D. Young, United States Government Cybersecurity 
Relationships, 8 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 281, 303−04 (2012). 
47 See generally Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6−7 (1972).   
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F.  Regress 
 
 Since cyberthreats do not fall neatly into the “inside” – 
“outside” threat dichotomy and consequently tend to resist the 
efforts of the correlate threat response systems on which we 
currently rely, another option would be to begin to decentralize 
threat response systems to place at least some responsibility for 
identifying and resisting threats on the civilian entities that are 
most likely to be targeted. The effort might eventually expand to 
do something similar with individual civilians, as well, but it 
would be more reasonable, and more feasible, to begin with 
corporate and other entities. 
 Such an effort would, in effect, involve extrapolating the 
common law militia and the posse comitatus into the cyber arena 
so that companies and other essential institutions would be charged 
with protecting themselves from attacks.  Government entities, 
including law enforcement and the military, could support them in 
this regard, with expertise, technologies and other assets.  The 
advantage of involving the civilian sector is that it would not only 
enhance the threat-detection and response capabilities of law 
enforcement and the military, it would also give both access to 
more detailed threat data than they currently have.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The cyberworld is so new that the old structures. 
. . break down. . . .48 
 
 My arguments and analysis in this piece may seem 
simplistic, and that may be a fair assessment because it is very 
difficult to addresses the complexities and nuances of the issues I 
elected to address in a relatively short piece.  My goal here is 
simply to point out issues that will become problematic and, as I 
noted earlier, speculate a bit about how we might address and 
resolve them.  I firmly believe that the challenges cyberspace 
creates for those we trust to protect us of threats of whatever kind 
cannot be underestimated if we are to address and overcome them.  
 
 
 
                                                
48 See Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-dragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, 
at 11. 
 
